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AIR FORCE INTEGRATED SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT 
PROCUREMENT ANALYSIS 
ABSTRACT 
 Across a majority of Air Force installations in the Continental United States 
(CONUS), there appear to be large variations in prices paid for Integrated Solid Waste 
Management (ISWM) contracted services, with little understanding as to why this 
variation occurs. To effectively analyze these ISWM contract price variations, we 
compared the Price Per Ton (PPT) of disposed solid waste paid by a sample of Air Force 
installations, to the PPT paid by co-located municipalities. We developed a methodology 
to test the hypothesis that the Air Force paid, on average, a greater PPT than their 
respective co-located municipalities. In addition to this hypothesis, we implemented 
multivariate linear regression modeling to determine any applicable ISWM cost drivers to 
help explain price variations. This research resulted in two findings: we were unable to 
determine that, on average, and at an appropriate level of confidence, that the Air Force 
pays more than respective municipalities, and that there are two significant cost drivers of 
Air Force ISWM PPT—number of containers used and the distance to landfills. We 
recommend the standardization of Air Force ISWM cost data to industry standards, and 
utilization of category management and strategic sourcing with ISWM contracts. 
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Across all United States Air Force installations in the Continental United States 
(CONUS), there appear to be large differences in prices paid for Integrated Solid Waste 
Management (ISWM) contracted services, with little understanding as to why they occur. 
The purpose of the research is to provide the Air Force with a tangible metric, such as 
average price per ton (PPT) of disposed solid waste, which can be compared against Air 
Force installation PPT as well as their co-located municipalities. These collected and 
standardized local city prices can then be compared to Air Force prices and used to 
determine whether the Air Force, on average, overpays for ISWM services. A comparison 
between both the local municipalities and Air Force installations will further assist  
Air Force contracting organizations in determining whether the prices paid are fair and 
reasonable when compared to the Air Force average and when compared to each individual 
installation’s municipality. 
This research used ISWM contract data from the Air Force Installation Contracting 
Agency (AFICA) to calculate a PPT ISWM cost of each Air Force base. Also, we used 
data collected from 20 municipalities to calculate the PPT ISWM cost for each local 
municipality. To effectively analyze ISWM contract price variances for solid waste 
disposal services between Air Force installations and between Air Force installations and 
their surrounding local municipalities, we used hypothesis testing to compare the 
difference in means across Air Force bases and local municipalities, as well as multivariate 
linear regressions to identify potential correlates of the cost drivers.  
We found that there were only two significant cost drivers correlated with Air Force 
PPT: Air Force base number of containers, and Air Force base distance to landfills. We 
found that as the Air Force base number of containers increased, the unit Air Force PPT 
costs correspondingly decreased. Alternatively, as the Air Force base distance-to-landfill 
cost driver increased, the unit Air Force PPT costs also increased. Also, we did not find, 
on average and at conventional levels of statistical confidence, that CONUS Air Force 
bases pay a higher PPT than their respective municipalities. Though we were unable to 
reject the null hypothesis using conservative conversion estimates, we were able to identify 
 xvi 
multiple Air Force bases that pay a significantly higher PPT than their respective 
municipalities. The Air Force installations with over twice the PPT costs of their local 
municipality are: Patrick Air Force Base, Peterson Air Force Base, Schriever Air Force 
Base, The United States Air Force Academy, Kirtland Air Force Base, Columbus Air Force 
Base, and McConnell Air Force Base.  
Additionally, we were able to identify multiple Air Force bases that pay a 
significantly lower PPT than their respective municipalities. The Air Force installations 
with less than half the PPT costs of their local municipality are: Davis-Monthan Air Force 
Base, F.E. Warren Air Force Base, Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, 
Fairchild Air Force Base, and Edwards Air Force Base. 
There are additional areas requiring further research. First, the Air Force needs to 
conduct further research on the installations with over twice the PPT costs of their local 
municipalities at the contract line item number (CLIN) level. The main cost drivers at each 
Air Force installation need to be identified in order to evaluate negative trends. 
Additionally, the Air Force should review the five contracts with less than half the PPT 
costs of their local municipality to identify best practices that can be utilized by all. Also, 
two areas we believe might explain the higher prices paid by the Air Force are the cost of 
regulation and additional security requirements placed on ISWM service. The additional 
federal laws and regulations placed on government ISWM programs and government 
contracts in general might explain the price differences between the local municipalities 
and Air Force bases. These two theories require more research to validate this theory and 
help identify the true cost of federal regulations. 
Finally, based on our findings, we recommend the following: 
1. Standardize the CLIN cost structure in ISWM contracts across all Air 
Force installations to be in accordance with industry standards. 
2. Require Air Force ISWM contracting officers to compare local 
municipality costs and all Air Force installation costs during market 
research. 
3. Require that each installation’s contracting officer provide detailed CLIN-
level data and a calculated PPT into a repository that is accessible to all, to 
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better accommodate contracting officers during the market research 
process. 
4. Perform a deep dive into the contracts of previously identified outliers to 
find the cost drivers creating such large variations. The deep dive will aid 
AFICA in developing comprehensive lessons learned and best practices 
that can be incorporated into future contracts to save scarce governmental 
funds. 
5. Utilize category management and strategic sourcing with ISWM contracts. 
ISWM contracts are a prime candidate to benefit from category 
management and strategic sourcing considering the large price variances 
across each installation. Consolidating ISWM services into a regional 
contract will allow the Air Force to assign experts in the ISWM market to 
manage ISWM service contracts. 
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Across all United States Air Force installations in the Continental United States 
(CONUS), there appear to be large differences in prices paid for Integrated Solid Waste 
Management (ISWM) contracted services, with little understanding as to why they occur. 
In regard to ISWM services, we believe that there should be few differences in the level of 
service provided to Air Force installations compared to their respective municipalities. As 
a result, there is an expectation that both organizations would have similar, if not identical 
ISWM contract costs. Further understanding of ISWM contracts procedure is imperative 
because its associated costs are significant: “Air Force ISWM spend from Fiscal Year (FY) 
2010–FY 2014 constitutes $281M of AF installation spend” (Brady et al., 2016, p. 6). This 
project develops the methodology to compare ISWM price differences between Air Force 
installations, local municipalities, and their associated cost drivers.  
B. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
This research will attempt to provide a means to identify efficiencies or 
inefficiencies in the procurement of ISWM services, which require substantial annual 
funding obligations. Our purpose is to improve future acquisitions of ISWM services and 
safeguard scarce government resources. Our team wants to deliver information to the Air 
Force that will aid them in ensuring ISWM services are provided by contractors at best 
value to the government. We want to provide the Air Force with a tangible metric, such as 
average price per ton (PPT) of disposed solid waste, which can be compared against Air 
Force installation PPT as well as their co-located municipalities. These collected and 
standardized local city prices can then be compared to Air Force prices and used to 
determine whether the Air Force on average overpays for ISWM services. A comparison 
between both the local municipalities and Air Force installations will further assist Air 
Force contracting organizations in determining whether or not the prices paid are fair and 
reasonable when compared to the Air Force average and when compared to the individual 
installations’ municipality.  
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The goal of this research is to answer the following questions: 
1. Using AFICA pricing data, what is driving the price variation (unit price) 
across CONUS Air Force installations for solid waste disposal services?  
2. Using municipality pricing data, how do municipality unit prices compare 
to Air Force unit prices?   
3. Using local cost of living indices, do local consumer price indices account 
for the variation in prices paid for solid waste disposal services? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This research used ISWM contract data from the Air Force Installation Contracting 
Agency (AFICA). AFICA provided us with the most recent Sub-Activity Management 
Plan (Sub-AMP) data which included number of bins, tons of solid waste, and the annual 
contract price of solid waste services at each Air Force installation. From those figures, we 
calculated a PPT ISWM cost of each Air Force Installation. In order to compare Air Force 
PPT costs, we surveyed a sample of municipalities co-located with the population of 
CONUS Air Force Installations. The results of this survey allowed us to determine 
municipality PPT costs. The standard rates provided by AFICA and cost data provided by 
local municipalities co-located with Air Force installations were used in this study. To 
effectively analyze ISWM contract price variances for solid waste disposal services 
between Air Force installations, and between Air Force installations and their surrounding 
local municipalities, we utilized hypothesis testing about the difference between two 
population means, as well as multivariate linear regression modelling to identify applicable 
cost drivers.  
The first and most important model we applied to the dataset was a hypothesis test 
to estimate whether the difference between the two population means was statistically 
significant. In the hypothesis test, we determined the null hypothesis, or the current 
assumption, would state that there should be no difference between the population of Air 
Force and municipality PPT ISWM costs. Whereas, the alternative hypothesis, or the 
opposite of the assumption, would state that there is a difference between the populations 
of Air Force and municipality PPT ISWM costs and that the Air Force costs are higher. To 
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test this hypothesis, we utilized the normalized cost dataset, using the PPT mean of the Air 
Force sample and the PPT mean of the municipality sample as point estimators of the 
means of each sample’s respective population. Following the development of the 
hypothesis, we established significance tests using three separate levels of significance to 
assess the potential of rejecting the null hypothesis when it may, in fact, be true. 
To identify systematic patterns effecting price variation for ISWM contracted 
services, we used multivariate linear regression modelling of Air Force installation ISWM 
costs against several independent variables. We chose the following independent variables: 
state’s Cost of Living Index, Consumer Price Index, County Average Weekly Wages, Air 
Force Base Population, County Population Density, Distance to Landfill, and a number of 
containers utilized. We decided these variables had the highest probability of explaining 
the differences in solid waste disposal prices across the U.S. Chapter III, Methodology, 
provides an in-depth look at the selection process for local municipalities and the 
application of statistical analysis and models. 
E. BENEFITS OF RESEARCH 
The goal of our research is to provide findings and recommendations that could be 
used by contracting officers as tools to optimize Air Force cost savings and efficiencies in 
ISWM procurement. Understanding these differences in ISWM costs across Air Force 
installations may help the Department of Defense (DoD) reduce service contract costs and 
allow reallocation of funds to better support the warfighter. The research will also aid in 
determining whether or not ISWM services are provided to the government at best value. 
F. LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH 
There are no databases that provide local government pricing information for 
ISWM services contracts. As a result, we had to request pricing information from each 
local municipality individually. The number of samples available for analysis was 
dependent on each city’s cooperation and willingness to aid in our research. As you will 
see in Chapter IV, Findings, this proved to be more of an issue than originally anticipated. 
Once we collected ISWM data through AFICA and municipality responses, we identified 
another major limitation of our research, finding that the quantitative data relating to ISWM 
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unit costs between the Air Force and municipalities were in the form of separate units of 
measure. Both the Air Force and municipality raw data would have to be normalized to 
compare apples-to-apples unit cost, specifically PPT. Chapter III, Methodology, will 
further explain how we converted and normalized the data. 
G. ORGANIZATION OF REPORT 
In this report, we conduct a Literature Review that provides a better understanding 
of the evolution of purchasing to supply management, which then evolved to strategic 
sourcing and category management. We also examine previous studies on DoD ISWM 
service contracts and the contribution of our work to this literature. Next, the report reviews 
the methodology utilized in our research, including the process used to collect ISWM cost 
data from Air Force installations and local municipalities. The methodology chapter 
discusses why and how we normalized the collected data to make a direct comparison 
between local municipalities and Air Force installations. Additionally, we explain the 
hypothesis test and regression analysis performed by our team. Following methodology, 
we provide a detailed report of our findings. The findings include qualitative analysis based 
on responses from local municipalities, and provide quantitative results and analysis of our 
hypothesis test and regression models. Finally, the last chapter provides our conclusions 
and recommendations, as well as areas requiring further research. 
H. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we provided a brief introduction to the background of ISWM service 
contracts, the purpose of our research, focused research questions, methodology, benefits 
of the research, limitations of the research, and organization of our report. The next chapter 
provides a literature review, which includes a synopsis of previous ISWM contract studies 
and the evolution of the procurement process. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this research is to compare Integrated Solid Waste Management 
(ISWM) price differences between Air Force installations, local municipalities, and their 
associated cost drivers. The comparison of price differences and the identification of cost 
drivers are activities involved in supply management, strategic sourcing, and category 
management. Thus, our literature review begins with a discussion of the evolution of 
purchasing to supply management, then to strategic sourcing and category management in 
the federal government’s acquisition process of services. Additionally, we examine 
previous studies conducted on ISWM service. 
B. PURCHASING AND SUPPLY MANAGEMENT 
Up until 2002, purchasing and procurement of services in the Department of 
Defense (DoD) was historically a “passive, administrative, and reactive process” with a 
transaction-oriented outlook (Rendon, 2005, p. 8). This is the norm until “Sections 801 
through 803 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2002, 
Pub. L. 107-107, establishe[d] a series of requirements impacting the acquisition of 
services” (Aldridge, 2002). In accordance with section 801(d) of NDAA FY 2002, the 
“Review of Department of Defense (DoD) Acquisition of Services” document was issued 
by Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD AT&L) 
on May 2002, with guidance on the new review structure and the process for the acquisition 
of services (Aldridge, 2002). Edward Aldridge Jr., then Under Secretary of Defense for 
AT&L, wrote in the “Acquisition of Services” memorandum: 
Through this guidance and other forthcoming guidance, it is my intent to 
move DoD to a more strategic and integrated approach to the acquisition of 
services that recognizes the importance of service acquisitions to the 
Department and the need to treat acquisition of services as seriously as we 
do the acquisition of hardware (2002). 
The changes to acquisition procedures, policies, and practices, in addition to 
resource constraints, pushed the DoD to implement and adopt the transformation of the 
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“procurement process to reflect an integrated strategic supply management perspective” 
which the commercial sector had been experiencing with great success (Rendon, 2005, pp. 
13–14). Supply management is a “proactive, strategic, [and] boundary-spanning function” 
with a strategic-oriented outlook to purchasing and procurement (Rendon, 2005, p.8). 
Supply management “embraces the other supply chain management function of material 
management, logistics, and physical distribution” (Rendon, 2005, p. 8). According to 
Rendon (2005), the concept of supply management focuses on: 
• supply management’s strategic contributions to organizational 
objectives[,] 
• [being] integrated with selected suppliers, working as one team toward 
mutual goals[,] 
• value-adding outputs such as quality, total ownership cost, time to market, 
technology, and continuity of supply[, and] 
• the [breakdown] of functional walls with the use of cross-functional 
teams, the development and management of supply chains and supply 
alliances, the use of electronic procurement systems, and the adoption of 
strategic sourcing approaches. (p. 9) 
C. STRATEGIC SOURCING 
Strategic sourcing is a business procurement process that top leading companies 
utilize to capitalize on economies of scale and leverage their buying power. As the saying 
goes, a dollar saved in purchasing is a dollar earned in profit. Rendon (2005) concurs that 
“[s]trategic sourcing is probably the most significant aspect characterizing an 
organization’s transformation to supply management” (p. 9). Commodity sourcing is an 
element of strategic sourcing where: 
“Commodities” is used solely to refer to categories or groups of services or 
supplies. The success of commodity strategy is based on maximizing the 
cost reduction advantages of leveraging combined buying power for volume 
discounts, using market experts to formulate a sourcing strategy, and 
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finally, forming strong relationships with preferred suppliers. (Rendon, 
2005, p. 9)  
In 2004, DoD established pilot programs in support of the DoD-Wide Services Sourcing 
(DWSS) Program implemented by the Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy 
(DPAP) Office as part of DoD’s procurement transformation “to reflect an integrated 
strategic supply management perspective” (Rendon, 2005, p.14). The DoD hopes to 
achieve the following objectives through the DWSS Program: 
• Develop department-wide cross-functional acquisition strategies in order 
to improve total cost ownership for acquired services, 
• Address improvements in meeting socio-economic goals through the use 
of strategic sourcing, 
• Leverage commercial best practices in order to streamline and standardize 
DoD acquisition business processes, and 
• Improve overall skills of DoD acquisition staff through the utilization of 
commercial tools and processes (Rendon, 2005, p. 14) 
As noted by DPAP (2018), who is responsible for all pricing, contracting, and procurement 
policy matters in DoD: 
Strategic Sourcing is a key practice within the Category Management 
framework. It is the collaborative and structured process of critically 
analyzing an organization’s spending and using this information to make 
business decisions. Strategic Sourcing involves the establishment or 
modification of acquisition vehicles to better address Federal Government 
procurement needs and more effectively leverage spend, market position, 
market knowledge (e.g., price benchmarks), and capabilities (e.g., IT 
integration) in contract terms and conditions. This process helps agencies 
optimize performance, minimize price, increase achievement of socio-
economic acquisition goals, evaluate total life cycle management costs, 
improve vendor access to business opportunities, and otherwise increase the 
value of each dollar spent. 
Strategic sourcing became a government-wide initiative when the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) produced a 2005 memorandum instructing all federal 
 8 
agencies to control spending by implementing strategic sourcing for reasonable contracts 
(U.S. Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2014, p. 5). According to GSA (n.d.), to 
support OMB’s mandate, GSA and U.S. Department of Treasury partnered up and 
launched the Federal Sourcing Initiative (FSSI). According to GAO (2014), the Office of 
Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) is overall responsible for FSSI while the Category 
Management Leadership Council (CMLC) governs the FSSI. The FSSI Program 
Management Office, located within the GSA, provides regular status reports to OFPP 
(GAO, 2014). As noted by GSA (2018b), the primary goals of FSSI are to: 
• Strategically source across federal agencies; 
• Establish mechanisms to increase total cost savings, value, and 
socioeconomic participation; 
• Collaborate with industry to develop optimal solutions; 
• Share best practices; and 
• Create a strategic sourcing community of practice. 
One of the current FSSI commodity solutions that support our research is the 
Building Maintenance and Operations (BMO) vehicle which provides “comprehensive and 
flexible solution covering all high demand [facility-related] services” (GSA, 2018a). BMO 
and BMO SB “is an open market, multiple-award, indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity 
(MA-IDIQ), government-wide contract vehicle supporting the strategic sourcing initiative 
to reduce costs and drive efficient purchasing by federal agencies” (GSA, 2018a). There 
are 16 service categories included in the BMO and Building Maintenance and Operations 
Small Business (BMO SB) commodity solution. The service category we were interested 
in and proved beneficial to our research was the Waste Management and Recycling 
Services category. 
BMO and BMO SB utilize a zonal approach to create reasonable size regions to 
encourage small businesses to participate in a full and open competition solicitation (GSA, 
2018a). As shown in Figure 1, Phase I and II zones have contracts in place with small 
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businesses, while Phase III represents the proposed future zones for BMO/BMO SB. One 
of the requirements for all awarded contractors is the capability to provide coverage for the 
entirety of the zone(s) they are awarded (GSA, 2017). The difference between  
Phase I/Zone1I ($15B) and Phase II/Zones 2–6 ($27B) is the maximum dollar ceiling for 
each task order (GSA, 2017). 
 
Figure 1.  Current and Future Phases and Zones for BMO/BMO SB. Source: 
GSA (2018a). 
D. CATEGORY MANAGEMENT 
Category Management is a business procurement strategy where companies will 
buy more effectively and save significant sums of money by purchasing like items in a 
single transaction or contract (Webb, 2015). Fortune 500 companies and the United 
Kingdom’s government have been using this acquisition approach since it leads to smarter 
decisions, better purchasing options, and saves dollars (Rung and Sharpe, 2015; Sharpe, 
2014).  
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Category management became a top priority for DoD in December 2014 when the 
Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) issued the “Transforming the Marketplace: 
Simplifying Federal Procurement to Improve Performance, Drive Innovation, and Increase 
Savings” memorandum to federal agencies. This strategy is part of OFPP’s continuous 
effort to “further streamline and manage the Federal Government’s vast goods and services 
more like a single enterprise–leading to big savings, better efficiencies, and improved 
performance” (Rung, 2016). OFPP, in the OMB, is responsible for providing “overall 
direction for government-wide procurement policies, regulations and procedures and to 
promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the acquisition processes” (Office of 
Management and Budget [OMB], n.d.). As noted by DPAP (2018): 
Category management is an approach the Federal Government is applying 
to buy smarter and more like a single enterprise. Category management 
enables the government to eliminate redundancies, increase efficiency, and 
deliver more value and savings from the government’s acquisition 
programs. It involves: Identifying core areas of spend; Collectively 
developing heightened levels of expertise; Leveraging shared best practices; 
and, Providing acquisition, supply and demand management solutions. 
The governance structure for category management are Category Management Leadership 
Council (CMLC), Category Managers, Category Team, Sub-Category Team, and finally 
the Commodity Team. The CMLC, chaired by OFPP administrator, is the governing board 
for category management initiatives and provides government-wide directions on category 
management strategy and initiatives (Category Management, n.d.; Gibson and Field, 
2018). The Gibson and Field (2018) powerpoint presentation lists the role and 
responsibilities of the different teams, 
• The Category Managers are “government experts in the 10 categories–
[and are responsible for] develop[ing] the government-wide strategy to 
drive improved performance and act as change agents for the category” 
(slide 3).  
• The Category Team is “responsible for the development and execution of 
category strategies for a specific category (e.g., IT)” (slide 3).  
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• The Sub-Category Team is “responsible for the development and 
execution of category-specific sub-strategies (e.g., IT software within the 
IT category)” (slide 3).  
• The Commodity Team is the “traditional strategic sourcing working group 
formed when the category management process identifies the need for a 
new acquisition solution” (slide 3).  
E. PREVIOUS STUDIES 
The purpose of this research is to compare ISWM price differences between Air 
Force installations, local municipalities, and their associated cost drivers. Our focus is to 
study the cost drivers that affect the price Air Force installations pay, compared to the price 
co-located municipalities pay, for ISWM services. Past studies focused on the Air Force’s 
internal procurement process and did not look into how other agencies procure ISWM 
services. 
As part of the Category Management pilot project effort, the Air Force produced a 
Category Intelligence Report (CIR) for ISWM. The CIR is a “detailed analysis that 
includes a category overview, data analysis, market analysis, competitive analysis (gap 
analysis) and cost improvement recommendation” (Brady et al., 2016, p.6). To “build 
actionable business intelligence,” the pilot team first reviews the Air Force’s ISWM 
requirements, then conducted data analysis, market analysis, and competitive analysis, and 
finally provides recommendations. The CIR describes the different sections of the report 
and what was the purpose of that section:  
• ISWM Requirements–“Was developed by ISWM Subject Matter Experts 
(SMEs) and describes the Air Force Common Output Level Standards (AF 
COLS) for ISWM services and the associated Sub-Activity Management 
Plan (Sub-AMP) data instrumental in understanding the Air Force 
management of ISWM” (Brady et al., 2016, p. 8). 
• “Data analysis–This section was build using a combination of Air Force 
contracting data (from systems like Contracting Business Intelligence 
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Service (CBIS) and the Sub-AMP functional data. This section identifies 
the total Air Fore spend on ISWM to include insights into the Air Force’s 
support of socio-economic categories (e.g., Small Business, 8A, Source 
America, etc.)” (Brady et al., 2016, p. 9). 
• “Market analysis–This section was developed using industry research 
tools such as IBISWorld, interviews with ISWM service providers, 
interviews with similar buyers of ISWM services, and interviews with Air 
Force installations. In this section, best practices and technologies are 
identified that may be helpful in reducing the Air Force’s ISWM costs 
(Brady et al., 2016, p. 9). 
• “Competitive analysis–This section was developed using the Air Force’s 
Sub-AMP reporting data and utilized key market cost driver information 
to establish Air Force benchmarks for costs per ton. In addition, the 
benchmarks were used to perform a comparative analysis and to identify 
cost performance gaps. Gaps were sorted largest to smallest specifically to 
identify opportunities where cost savings measures can be taken” (Brady 
et al., 2016, p. 9). 
• “Recommendations–This section outlines the pilot team’s 
recommendations for the Air Force to take action to begin to close the cost 
performance gaps. These recommendations were developed through 
several brainstorming sessions with the AFCEC SMEs and leveraged 
information learned throughout the process” (Brady et al., 2016, pp. 9). 
The CIR focused on Air Force and market industry to identify cost performance 
gaps and ways to reduce the Air Force’s ISWM costs, but it did not investigate whether or 
not the Air Force installations and their local municipalities are paying the same price for 
ISWM services. Our research focuses on Air Force installations and their local 
municipalities to determine whether the Air Force is paying below, same, or above the local 
municipal ISWM service cost. The goal of the research is to identify the price drivers 
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causing the difference and provide recommendations to improve ISWM procurement 
processes. 
The waste management literature also includes studies on whether or not the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), specifically FAR part 6, and performance affects 
the price. The FAR governs the federal government’s acquisition process and FAR part 6, 
Competition Requirement, lists all the rules and regulations applicable for the different 
types of competition available in the procurement process. Apte, Landale, Rendon, and 
Salmerón conducted a study: 
On the procurement of integrated solid waste management (ISWM) within 
the Air Force to identify the relationship between service-related price 
drivers, contract-related price drivers, price, and contractor 
performance…focus is to study the effect that price drivers (both service 
and contract) have on contract price and contractor performance. (Apte, 
Landale, Rendon, and Salmerón, 2017, p. 2)  
This study tested seven hypotheses, using sequential multiple regression, the Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum Test, and ordered logistic regression. Their findings indicate that the number of 
containers has the most significant effect on price while small business set-asides did not 
significantly affect the Price Per Ton or Price Per Container. Small business set-asides will 
not matter since the award of ISWM services are “subject to the lowest cost technically 
acceptable source selection method, where price is the main determinant of award” (Apte, 
Landale, Rendon, and Salmerón, 2017, p. 23). This research helped dispel the 
misconception that small business set-asides are the reason DoD pay more for services and 
let us focus on other price drivers, such as distance to landfill, consumer price index, Air 
Force base population, etc. 
Finally, Arruda and Clark (2017) conducted a study on category management of 
common, recurring service contracts, e.g., ISWM, to demonstrate how category 
management would result in cost savings with a focus on strategic sourcing. The study 
explored available sources and method (clustering continuum, commercial business 
mapping software, etc.) to determine the best approach to the acquisition of ISWM 
services. They developed the Arruda-Clark-Fuchs (ACF) methodology “to account for all 
the complexities of a given service requirement” as the regular clustering methodology was 
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not able to account “the inherently complex nature of services” (Arruda and Clark, 2017, 
p. 37). The ACF method consists of four steps, which will help the acquisition teams 
strategically source ISWM services. Arruda and Clark (2017) describe the four steps as: 
1. Identify DoD requiring activities for a given service  
2. Identify cost-driver market intelligence relevant to developing clusters  
3. Integrate cost-driver market intelligence into commercial mapping 
software  
4. Use cost-driver market intelligence to determine optimal cluster size. (p. 
21) 
Arruda and Clark’s research goal was to provide “versatile, commercial-off-the-
shelf software that provides the capability to map DoD requiring activities and cluster them 
[…] the intent was to provide a flexible solution to category management teams that offered 
the benefit of continuous improvement through software upgrades[…]” (Arruda and Clark, 
2017, p. 37). Arruda and Clark (2017) attempted to use ISWM services to validate their 
ACF methodology, focusing within the Los Angeles area, but the research was inclusive 
since they did not have sufficient data to quantify possible savings.  
F. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we presented a literature review on the evolution of purchasing to 
supply management, then to strategic sourcing and category management, and previous 
studies of ISWM. Understanding the evolution of DoD’s acquisition process will provide 
the foundation for what the federal government is striving toward concerning the 
acquisition of services, as well as examining previous studies, will show how our research 
differs. As previously stated, the purpose of this research is to compare ISWM price 
differences between Air Force installations, local municipalities, and their associated cost 
drivers. The following chapter is a discussion of our research methodology. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Across all Air Force installations in the Continental United States (CONUS), there 
appear to be large differences in prices paid for Integrated Solid Waste Management 
(ISWM) contracted services. There is little understanding as to why this variation occurs. 
To identify systematic patterns, we use regression analysis on Air Force installations 
ISWM costs against several independent variables. We chose the following independent 
variables: state’s cost of living index, consumer price index, county average weekly wages, 
Air Force base population, county population density, distance to landfill, and a number of 
containers utilized. We decided these variables had the highest probability of explaining 
the differences in solid waste disposal prices across the U.S.   
With the large variation across Air Force installations, there is concern that 
variation may also exist between the installations and local municipalities. Identifying 
variation between local municipalities and Air Force installations will aid us in identifying 
if prices paid by the Air Force are fair and reasonable. The prices paid for ISWM services 
by a local municipality, and the adjacent Air Force base, should be the same, considering 
they have similar market conditions. Both local municipalities and Air Force bases are 
government organizations with similar requirements based on the size of the organizations. 
Identified price variations will provide a better understanding of why some installations 
are paying higher prices than others. We analyzed ISWM contract price variances for solid 
waste disposal services between Air Force installations and their surrounding local 
municipalities through t-tests of the difference in population mean between the two. 
We also felt it was beneficial to capture qualitative data on how municipalities 
contract and manage ISWM services to understand industry standards, and to better 
identify trends in the local government. A thorough understanding of contracting methods 
and cost structures, utilized by local municipalities, could assist us and provide the Air 
Force with additional recommendations to improve ISWM contracting. 
 16 
B. COST DATA COLLECTION  
We contacted the Air Force Installation Contracting Agency (AFICA) to inquire if 
necessary pricing information on ISWM service contracts was available. Fortunately, 
AFICA already collects data on installation contracts from each Air Force base. AFICA 
provided us with the most recent Sub-Activity Management Plan (Sub-AMP) data which 
included number of bins, tons of solid waste, and the annual contract price of solid waste 
services at each installation. From those figures, we calculated the Price Per Ton (PPT) at 
each Air Force Installation. 
Following the collection of relevant Air Force pricing data, the next step was to 
gather pricing data from local municipalities. We chose local municipalities based on two 
parameters: the city must be within 30 miles of the Air Force installation, and must be a 
part of the same county. These parameters are necessary to ensure both the Air Force 
installation and local municipality have the same market conditions. It also ensures both 
the installation and municipality have the capability of using the same commercial vendors 
for solid waste disposal. 
Before contacting the selected municipalities, we contacted the City of Monterey 
Public Works Office to gain further insight into how city governments contract solid waste 
disposal. We met with the Sustainability Coordinator for the City of Monterey and gained 
insight into the contracting vehicles used by city governments. From that meeting, we 
learned there are four general ways that city governments contract solid waste services. 
These four ways include franchise agreements, city-owned solid waste haulers, three to 
five-year term contracts, and finally, open market with operating permits. Also, we 
discovered that the Naval Postgraduate School contracts solid waste services on a Firm 
Fixed Price (FFP), with a surcharge fee, through the City of Monterey. Finally, the City of 
Monterey informed us that it bases its rates on collection bin size and frequency of 
collections per week. As a result of this meeting, the team was able to create five 
standardized questions to ask selected municipalities. The five questions are as follows: 
1. What type of contract does your city use for solid waste disposal?  
2. What are the negotiated rates for solid waste collection at city-owned 
buildings (e.g., per bin size and frequency of collection)?  
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3. What are your published prices for commercial business rates for solid 
waste  collection (e.g., per bin size and frequency of collection)?  
4. Is the local Air Force installation’s solid waste contract managed by your 
city? What are the Air Force base’s rates? Are the Air Force base’s rates 
the same as the negotiated rates for the city? What is the surcharge rate 
applied to the  Air Force for the city to manage its solid waste contract? 
5. Are there standing city regulations requiring the local Air Force 
installation utilize the same hauler that is already contracted with the city?  
These qualitative responses are important to the research in the following capacity. 
The responses from question (1) will help to understand the solid waste contracting 
vehicles used by city governments, identify the most common methods used, and see if 
there are best practices that the Air Force can leverage. The responses from question (2) 
and (3) will provide us with the prices paid by local municipalities that will aid in data 
analysis and comparisons with Air Force installations. The responses from question (4) 
will aid us in identifying if the city manages the contract similar to the City of Monterey, 
positing that prices should be identical. This question will also provide a potential reason 
for variation in prices due to additional surcharges. Finally, question (5) will help to rule 
out any regulations that might prevent Air Force installations from contracting with the 
same solid waste hauler utilized by the city. 
Once we established these questions, we submitted a standardized email to the 63 
municipalities, see Appendix A. The team decided it was best first to contact each city’s 
government office by phone and identify the Solid Waste Contract Administrator, 
introduce ourselves, and briefly explain our study in accordance with the standardized 
format. Following our initial introduction over the phone, we then followed up with the 
standardized email.  
C. NORMALIZATION OF COST DATA 
Once we collected ISWM data through AFICA and municipality responses, we 
found that the quantitative data relating to ISWM unit costs between the Air Force and 
municipalities were in the form of separate units of measure. AFICA tracked Air Force 
ISWM costs through total contract costs per installation. These costs were typically 
annualized by straight line costing for a contract which ranged from three to five years per 
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installation. As Air Force ISWM costs were typically recorded as the total cost of a contract 
per year, this created difficulties when trying to normalize and compare the total cost of 
contract from a respective municipality. The ISWM data received from municipalities were 
not in a total cost format or annualized terms. Instead, municipality data was in unit cost, 
as in price per cubic yard and frequency of collection, which corresponded with the size of 
waste container offered by either the municipality or solid waste contracted company.  
For us to compare the cost of solid waste for the Air Force in relation to the 
municipality for which it was co-located, we concluded that costs would have to be 
converted to a unit cost, specifically PPT. Both the Air Force and municipality raw data 
would have to be normalized to compare apples-to-apples unit costs.  
We found that Air Force raw data provided by AFICA, specifically the total 
annualized contract price of each installation, could be divided by the annual number of 
tons of solid waste disposed. This would give the team a PPT unit of measure with which 
to compare to municipality unit costs. However, municipality unit costs were provided as 
cost per cubic yard, where cubic yard containers came in sizes: two cubic yards, four cubic 
yards, six cubic yards, and eight cubic yards. Additionally, the prices of each size container 
provided by the municipality or solid waste contracted company varied by the frequency 
of scheduled solid waste collection per week. Standard frequency of collection provided 
by the municipality or solid waste contracted company typically ranged from one to five 
times per week. Table 1 is an example of municipality solid waste unit costs. The price 
data format provided by Albuquerque, NM was typical of price data received by other 
municipalities and is only included as an example of the price sheets collected. 
Table 1.   Municipality Solid Waste Price Sheet. 
 
 
Albuquerque, NM 1X 2X 3X 4X 5X 6X 7X
2yd $56.52 $107.68 $158.84 $210.01 $261.17 $312.33 N/A
4yd $83.99 $161.84 $239.70 $317.55 $395.41 $473.26 N/A
6yd $112.92 $217.47 $322.01 $426.56 $531.10 $635.65 N/A
8yd $145.85 $277.08 $408.32 $539.56 $670.79 $802.03 N/A
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Normalizing municipality cost data to Air Force costs of PPT created two separate 
challenges. The first and most salient challenge was converting municipality costs of price 
per cubic yards, a measure of volume, into Air Force costs of PPT, which is a measure of 
weight. To convert cubic yards to tons, we had to find data relating to the average weight 
of one cubic yard of solid waste.  
The United States Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Office of Resource 
Conservation and Recovery published standard volume-to-weight conversion factors for 
use by state and local governments in comparing recycling efforts between municipalities, 
regions, and states ((Environmental Protection Agency [EPA], n.d.). These conversion 
factors included the standard weight per cubic yard of un-compacted, residential, 
institutional, and commercial solid waste, with an estimated weight of 300 to 600 pounds 
(EPA, n.d.). Using this estimated range the team chose to use the more conservative 
estimate, in relation to our hypothesis, of 300 pounds per cubic yard of un-compacted solid 
waste as opposed to 600 pounds.   
After we converted volume based municipal price data into weight-based price 
data, we compared Air Force solid waste costs with municipal solid waste costs. Though 
unit costs were in the same unit of measure, the team had to decide what frequency of 
municipal container collection per week they would choose to convert. Using the same 
conservative principals in choosing 300 pounds per cubic yard, the team chose the highest 
cost per unit according to the frequency. On average, the cost of emptying solid waste was 
the highest per unit at the frequency of once per week. For instance, additional collections 
per week would inevitably raise the total cost of emptying each cubic yard container; 
however, subsequent collections per week lowered the cost of each collection at a 
marginally steep learning curve. Therefore, the marginal cost continually diminished as the 
frequency of collection increased.  
After converting the municipality price data to frequencies of once per week, the 
team found that the majority of municipality responses contained price data for a two cubic 
yard container, emptied once per week, which provided the largest data set from the sample 
of which to compare to Air Force unit price. The municipality responses that failed to 
provide price data for two cubic yard containers at a frequency of once per week, or prices 
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that were in the form of other units of measure, were excluded from the sample data set in 
the comparison of Air Force and municipality costs.  
With municipality price data converted to PPT, we compared PPT of each Air Force 
installation with their corresponding municipality. The finalization of data normalization 
allowed for us to compare 20 paired observations of Air Force PPT vice municipality PPT. 
Table 2 shows the normalized data set comparing PPT.  
Table 2.   Converted Air Force and Municipality Price Per Ton (PPT). 
 
 
After normalizing the cost data set, we establish various statistical point estimates 
and measures of variability for both Air Force and municipal cost data, specifically the 
mean, median, mode, range, variance, standard deviation, and coefficient of variation. This 
statistical analysis allowed the application of various models to the cost data in an attempt 
to develop an analysis and understanding of the variance in Air Force and municipality 
solid waste costs.   
Observation Element Names
Installation AF Price per Ton (PPT) Municipality Converted PPT
1 Davis-Monthan AFB 78.19$                                                    316.67$                                           
2 Patrick AFB 298.83$                                                  116.47$                                           
3 Peterson AFB 288.59$                                                  73.77$                                              
4 Schriever AFB 284.62$                                                  73.77$                                              
5 USAFA 192.09$                                                  73.77$                                              
6 Luke AFB 199.37$                                                  116.10$                                           
7 Malmstrom AFB 213.88$                                                  136.30$                                           
8 Kirtland AFB 448.26$                                                  188.40$                                           
9 Dyess AFB 41.52$                                                    67.07$                                              
10 Goodfellow AFB 429.80$                                                  265.13$                                           
11 F E Warren AFB 62.33$                                                    385.33$                                           
12 Columbus AFB 855.95$                                                  166.67$                                           
13 Whiteman AFB 125.87$                                                  200.00$                                           
14 Buckley AFB 91.41$                                                    140.00$                                           
15 McConnell AFB 270.36$                                                  120.00$                                           
16 March AFB 165.16$                                                  306.87$                                           
17 NAS JRB Ft. Worth 55.74$                                                    138.27$                                           
18 Fairchild AFB 187.46$                                                  611.87$                                           
19 Homestead ARB 359.25$                                                  244.27$                                           
20 Edwards AFB 75.83$                                                    311.00$                                           
Variables
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D. HYPOTHESIS TEST AND MODELING 
The first and most important model we applied to the dataset was a hypothesis test 
to estimate whether the difference between the two population means is statistically 
significant. Our research is concerned with the population of Air Force installations within 
CONUS, and the PPT ISWM cost of each installation. The second population is the 
municipality co-located with its respective Air Force installation and their solid waste 
management cost of PPT. In the hypothesis test, we determined the null hypothesis, or the 
current assumption, would state that there should be no difference between the population 
of Air Force and municipality PPT ISWM costs. Whereas, the alternative hypothesis, or 
the opposite of the assumption, would state that there is a difference between the population 
of Air Force and municipality PPT ISWM costs and that the Air Force costs are higher. 
The hypothesis could also be written as Ho: M1-M2 = 0; Ha: M1-M2 ≠ 0; where M1 is 
equal to the Air Force ISWM PPT population mean, and M2 is equal to the municipality 
ISWM PPT population mean.   
To test this hypothesis, we utilized the normalized cost dataset, using the mean of 
the Air Force sample and the mean of the municipality sample as point estimators of the 
means of each sample’s respective population. Following the development of the 
hypothesis, we established significance tests using three separate levels of significance to 
assess the potential of rejecting the null hypothesis when it may, in fact, be true. To test the 
hypothesis, we would use the t-distribution as the test statistic to compare to the levels of 
significance, as the mean of both Air Force and municipality costs of PPT are unknown 
and our sample size, or n, being less than 30. Using Microsoft Excel’s data analysis 
package, we computed the test statistic, specifically running the “t-Test: Two Sample 
Assuming Unequal Variances,” analysis tool. Comparing the test statistic to the one-tailed 
critical value would allow us to determine if the null hypothesis could be rejected at each 
level of significance.  
Following the primary hypothesis test, the next step would be to apply regression 
analysis to determine applicable cost drivers to the Air Force ISWM PPT. The cost drivers 
to be analyzed can be broken down into cost of living related independent variables such 
as the state cost of living index, consumer price index, and average weekly wage. Secondly, 
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population-based independent variables such as the Air Force base population and the 
county population density. Finally, cost drivers can be categorized as Air Force base 
number of containers, and the Air Force bases’ distance to landfills. With the exception of 
the number of containers variable, which was derived from AFICA provided data, all other 
variables were available through open source government and private websites.  
E. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we were able to hone in on the driving forces behind perceived price 
variations for the Air Force ISWM contracted services through the use of hypothesis testing 
and regression modelling. Comparing cost data provided by AFICA with cost data gathered 
and normalized from municipalities will allow us to determine if Air Force ISWM costs 
vary significantly from respective municipality ISWM costs. With normalized cost data, 
we can now feasibly compare ISWM unit costs of a sample of 20 paired observations with 
Air Force ISWM unit costs, using point estimators of the means of each sample’s respective 
population. The results of this hypothesis test, as well as the analysis of ISWM cost drivers 
will help provide the basis for any ISWM procurement recommendations we make to Air 




A. QUALITATIVE RESULTS 
1. Local Municipality Response Distribution 
We contacted 69 cities across the continental United States that would be used to 
compare Integrated Solid Waste Management (ISWM) prices to adjacent Air Force bases. 
Each city was contacted multiple times by phone and email over the course of three months. 
By the end of the three months, 31 of the 69 cities responded to our inquiries, which equates 
to a 45% response rate.  
The distribution of responses per region was high, with one exception. The southern 
and southwest regions have a response rate of 60% (19 of 32 bases). Midwestern states 
also had similar response rates, which equated to 64% (9 of 14 bases). The region with the 
biggest gap in responses, based on the concentration of Air Force bases, is the Northeast. 
The Northeastern states have a total of nine Air Force installations, and not one of them 
responded to inquiries. Despite three months of trying to get responses, we still came up 
with a 0% response rate. Figure 2 shows the response distribution and the red dots mark 
the cities that responded. 
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Figure 2.  Distribution of Local Municipality Responses. 
2.  Qualitative Responses 
There were three qualitative questions asked of each local municipality. The three 
questions were as follows: 
1. What type of contract does your city use for solid waste disposal? 
2. Is the local Air Force installation’s solid waste contract managed by your 
city? What are the Air Force base’s rates? Are the Air Force base’s rates 
the same as the negotiated rates for the city? What is the surcharge rate 
applied to the Air Force for the city to manage its solid waste contract? 
3. Are there standing city regulations requiring the local Air Force 
installation utilize the same hauler that is already contracted with the city? 
The results from question (1) provided five different ways that local municipalities 
manage their solid waste disposal services. Three of the 31 cities, 10%, manage their 
ISWM with a 3-year term contract. Five of the 31 cities, 16%, manage their ISWM with a 
5-year contract. Twelve of 31 cities, 39%, manage their ISWM services and do not contract 
out. Seven of 31 cities, 22%, manage their ISWM with a franchise agreement. Finally, four 
of 31, 13%, offer an open market for ISWM. The cities that allow an open market manage 
the solid waste vendors through an annual permit issued by the city. If there are too many 
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complaints against a vendor, and those complaints are validated by the city government, 
then the vendor’s permit to operate within city limits are revoked. 
The responses from question (2) showed that only one of 31 cities, 3%, managed 
or contracted ISWM services with the Air Force installations. The most surprising was the 
negative responses with cities who managed their own solid waste program. Only one local 
municipality which falls under this category services the Air Force installation, based on 
responses from the local governments. The other Air Force installations contract with an 
outside contractor. 
The responses from question (3) showed zero city regulations requiring Air Force 
bases to use the same solid waste haulers as the local municipality. This is also evident 
from the responses received from question (2). Table 3 shows the responses to our three 
qualitative questions by the local municipality and their corresponding Air Force Base. 
 26 
Table 3.   Qualitative Local Municipality Responses. 
 
 
B. QUANTITATIVE RESULTS  
As outlined in Chapter III, there is large variation in prices paid for ISWM 
contracted services across all Air Force installations in CONUS. In an attempt to verify if 
these differences across installations are significant, we conducted a hypothesis t-test to 
see at what significance we could say the Air Force was paying more than their respective 
local municipality for ISWM costs. We were able to derive 20 paired observations from 
the original 31 responses from municipalities. Three of the 11 municipalities were not able 
AF Installation
What type of contract does your 
city use for solid waste disposal?
Is the local Air Force installation’s 
solid waste contract managed by your 
city? What are the Air Force base’s 
rates? Are the Air Force base’s rates 
the same as the negotiated rates for 
the city? What is the surcharge rate 
applied to the Air Force for the city to 
manage its solid waste contract?
Are there standing city 
regulations requiring the local 
Air Force installation utilize the 
same hauler that is already 
contracted with the city?
Davis-Monthan AFB 3yr Term No No
Whiteman 3yr Term No No
Buckley AFB 3yr Term No No
Peterson AFB 5yr Term No No
Schriever AFB 5yr Term No No
USAFA 5yr Term No No
Dyess AFB 5yr Term No No
Goodfellow AFB 5yr Term No No
Vandenberg AFB CA City Owned No No
Tyndall AFB City Owned No No
Seymour Johnson AFB City Owned No No
Malmstrom AFB City Owned No No
Kirtland AFB City Owned No No
F E Warren AFB City Owned No No
Sheppard AFB City Owned No No
Fairchild AFB City Owned No No
Dobbins ARB City Owned No No
Columbus AFB City Owned Yes No
Homestead ARB City Owned No No
Scott AFB City Owned No No
Patrick AFB Franchise Agreement No No
March AFB Franchise Agreement No No
Offutt AFB Franchise Agreement No No
NAS JRB Ft. Worth Franchise Agreement No No
Edwards, AFB Franchise Agreement No No
MacDill AFB Franchise Agreement No No
Beale AFB Franchise Agreement No No
Luke AFB Open Market No No
McConnell AFB Open Market No No
Keesler AFB Open Market No No
Grissom Open Market No No
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or unwilling to provide cost data due to proprietary relationships with their ISWM 
contractors. Five of the 11 municipalities could not provide sufficient ISWM cost data to 
allow us to normalize ISWM Price Per Ton (PPT). The remaining three municipalities did 
provide sufficient cost data, however, AFICA did not provide sufficient cost data for co-
located Air Force installations. Through the analysis of the sample of 20 Air Force 
installations and their paired municipality, we found the averages of ISWM PPT costs, 
determining that the Air Force average was indeed higher than the municipality average. 
Table 4 shows the various measures of location and variability compared to the Air Force 
and municipalities. 
Table 4.   Comparison of Air Force and Municipality PPT Measures of 
Location and Variability. 
 
 
The sample mean of the 20 municipality and Air Force PPT observations were 
$202.59 and $239.23 respectively. Additionally, the coefficients of variation, which 
indicates how large the standard deviations are in relations to each mean, were 66.6% for 
municipalities and 80.5% for the Air Force. The magnitude of the coefficient of variation 
for each PPT shows the large variation of prices for each observation using a standard 
normal distribution. Though it might be tempting to compare the sample means of both Air 
Force and municipality, concluding that the Air Force PPT is on average higher than 
municipality PPT, a hypothesis test was required to see if these sample results could be 
applied to each respective population. 
Our null hypothesis stated that there should be no difference in Air Force and 
municipality PPT. The alternate hypothesis stated that there is a difference between Air 






Standard Deviation 190.24 134.95
Coefficient of Variation (%) 80.53 66.61
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Force and municipality PPT and that Air Force PPT is indeed higher. This hypothesis is 
written as Ho: M1-M2 = 0; Ha: M1-M2 ≠ 0; where M1 is equal to the Air Force ISWM 
PPT population mean, and M2 is equal to the municipality ISWM PPT population mean. 
Using the 20 sample results, we ran the “t-Test: Two Sample Assuming Unequal 
Variances” analysis tool from Microsoft Excel’s data analysis package, using an alpha of 
0.1 or 90% level of confidence. Table 5 shows the results of this t-test. 
Table 5.   t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances (a=.1). 
 
 
Using the critical value approach, we compared the “T-stat” value of 0.6450 with 
the “t critical one-tail” value of 1.3069. As the “t critical one-tail” value is greater than the 
“t Stat” value, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 90% level of significance. Stated 
alternately, we cannot say that nine out of 10 times there would be a difference between 
the means. We conducted subsequent hypothesis tests at lower levels of confidence, and it 
was not until a test at the 70% level of confidence, did the t-test produce a result where the 
null hypothesis could be rejected. Table 6 shows the results of the t-test using an alpha of 
0.3, or 70% level of confidence.  








t Critical one-tail 1.306951587
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.523236896
t Critical two-tail 1.690924255
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Table 6.   t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances (a=.3). 
  
 
It is generally accepted that when evaluating the results of a hypothesis test with an 
alpha greater than 0.1, or lower than 90% level of confidence, it is non-standard to reject a 
null hypothesis with such a low level of certainty. Alternatively, to reject the null 
hypothesis would mean a 30% chance of us committing a type I error or rejecting the null 
hypothesis when it is in fact true. Combining this practice and the fact that we gathered 
only a sample of 20 observations, we could not conclude that on average, the Air Force 
was paying a higher PPT than their co-located municipality.  
After gathering the findings of our original hypothesis test, we conducted 
sensitivity analysis to determine if the volume-to-weight conversion factors used in 
calculating the municipality PPT had a significant effect on the municipality PPT average. 
We used the non-conservative upper estimate of 600 pounds for the standard weight per 
cubic yard of un-compacted, residential, institutional, and commercial solid waste to 
determine municipal PPT. Replacing the estimate of 300 pounds with 600 pounds had a 
significant effect on the municipality PPT average, inevitably halving the original sample 
mean of $202.59 to $101.29. We ran a t-test using the new municipality sample mean and 
determined that using a non-conservative volume-to-weight conversion factor of 600 
pounds, we could reject the null hypothesis with a 99% level of confidence. Table 7 shows 
the results of this test.  








t Critical one-tail 0.529353194
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.523236896
t Critical two-tail 1.052484878
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Table 7.   Sensitivity Analysis. 
 
 
Though we could not conclude that Air Force costs were higher on average using 
conservative volume-to-weight conversion factors, we were able to compare individual 
PPT variances between each observed Air Force and municipality dataset. We compared 
individual price variances in an attempt to identify outliers of any paired dataset. Figure 3 
shows a graphical comparison of PPT for each Air Force installation and local municipality 
paired dataset. 
 
Figure 3.  Comparison of Paired Air Force and Municipality PPT. 








t Critical one-tail 1.317835934
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.006361053
t Critical two-tail 1.71088208
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Of the 20 observations, we found that the Air Force PPT was higher than 
municipality PPT 11 times, 55%. Seven of the 11 times, 63%, the Air Force PPT was over 
twice that of the municipality PPT. The highest Air Force PPT and coincidentally the 
greatest disparity between Air Force and municipality costs occur with Columbus Air 
Force Base (AFB) and the city of Columbus, Mississippi, at a PPT of $855.95 and $166.67, 
respectively. This difference is significant as Columbus AFB PPT is over five times that 
of the city of Columbus. The Air Force installations with over twice the PPT costs of their 
local municipality are: 
• Patrick Air Force Base 
• Peterson Air Force Base 
• Schriever Air Force Base 
• The United States Air Force Academy 
• Kirtland Air Force Base 
• Columbus Air Force Base 
• McConnell Air Force Base 
Of the nine times the municipality PPT was higher than the Air Force PPT, the 
municipality PPT was over twice that of the Air Force PPT a total of five times, 55%. The 
highest municipality PPT in the sample was Spokane, Washington at $611.87, over three 
times the PPT of Fairchild AFB. However, the greatest disparity between municipality and 
Air Force costs, when the municipality PPT is greater than the Air Force PPT, was in the 
city of Cheyenne, Wyoming and F.E. Warren AFB, at a PPT of $385.33 and $62.33, 
respectively. This variance is significant as F.E. Warren AFB PPT is less than one-sixth 
that of the city of Cheyenne. The Air Force installations with less than half the PPT costs 
of their local municipality are: 
• Davis-Monthan Air Force Base 
• F.E. Warren Air Force Base 
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• Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth 
• Fairchild Air Force Base 
• Edwards Air Force Base 
C. ANALYSIS OF COST DRIVERS  
Following the analysis of individual differences in each paired case, we conducted 
simple linear regression models, comparing potentially applicable cost driver independent 
variables, as described in chapter III, to the Air Force ISWM PPT dependent variable. 
These cost drivers were: state cost of living index, consumer price index, county average 
weekly wage, Air Force base population, county population density, Air Force base number 
of containers, and Air Force base distance to landfill. These seven independent variables 
were individually compared to the Air Force ISWM PPT to determine the overall 
significance, or F-test, and secondly the coefficient of determination, or r2, to determine 
the regression relationship between the independent and dependent variables. What about 
the individual coefficients on the independent variables? 
Using an alpha of 0.2, we first determined which independent variables or cost 
drivers were significant using Microsoft Excel’s regression data analysis tool. We found 
that of the seven cost drivers, five of the seven were insignificant. These five insignificant 
independent variables were: state cost of living index, consumer price index, county 
average weekly wage, Air Force Base population, and county population density. We 
determined that two of the seven cost drivers were significant, the independent variable of 
Air Force Base number of containers and Air Force Base distance to landfill. 
The cost driver of Air Force Base distance to landfill was the most significant 
independent variable, producing a significance F-test of 0.1224. The coefficient of 
determination was 0.0510, meaning that the regression relationship is present yet weak, 
where 5.1% of the variability in the Air Force ISWM PPT can be explained by the linear 
relationship between Air Force Base distance to landfill and Air Force ISWM PPT.  
Table 8 shows the regression analysis tool’s summary output of Air Force Base distance to 
landfill independent variable and Air Force ISWM PPT dependent variable. Figure 4 shows 
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a scatter diagram which fits a linear trendline showing the estimated regression equation 
of Air Force Base distance to landfill independent variable and Air Force ISWM PPT 
dependent variable. 




Figure 4.  Regression Scatter Plot: Air Force Base Distance to Landfill. 
The cost driver of Air Force Base number of containers was the second most 








df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 60649.06294 60649.06 2.476434744 0.122417534
Residual 46 1126561.845 24490.47
Total 47 1187210.908
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 70.0% Upper 70.0%
Intercept 216.3241378 40.78511255 5.303998 3.14847E-06 134.2279643 298.4203114 173.5711385 259.0771372
Distance to Landfill 5.052440255 3.210611393 1.573669 0.122417534 -1.410185288 11.5150658 1.686916458 8.417964052
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of determination was 0.0392, meaning that the regression relationship is present yet weak, 
where 3.9% of the variability in the Air Force ISWM PPT can be explained by the linear 
relationship between Air Force Base number of containers and Air Force ISWM PPT. 
Table 9 shows the regression analysis tool’s summary output of Air Force Base number of 
containers independent variable and Air Force ISWM PPT dependent variable. Figure 5 
shows a scatter diagram that fits a linear trendline showing the estimated regression 
equation of Air Force Base number of containers independent variable and Air Force 
ISWM PPT dependent variable.  










df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 42500.6378 42500.64 1.71495 0.197463015
Residual 42 1040862.046 24782.43
Total 43 1083362.684
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 70.0% Upper 70.0%
Intercept 313.8234481 37.64085151 8.33731 1.9E-10 237.8611344 389.7857618 274.323533 353.3233631
# of Containers -0.230548863 0.176050476 -1.30956 0.197463 -0.585833107 0.12473538 -0.415294387 -0.045803339
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Figure 5.  Regression Scatter Plot: Air Force Base Number of Containers. 
In addition to analyzing the regression relationship between Air Force ISWM PPT 
and the Air Force Bases’ number of containers, we analyzed the individual price variations 
of installations with more than 75 containers and the price variations of less than 75 
containers. We found that 13 of the 20 bases had more than 75 containers and the remaining 
seven had less than 75 containers. We found that the average Air Force ISWM PPT of 
bases with more than 75 containers was significantly less than the PPT of bases with less 
than 75 containers. Figure 6 and 7 show the comparison of paired Air Force and 
municipality PPT for bases with less than and greater than 75 containers. Air Force Bases 
with greater than 75 containers had an average PPT of $177.20, significantly less than 
$345.84, the average PPT of bases with less than 75 containers. Additionally, the average 
PPT of Air Force Bases with greater than 75 containers was less than the average 
municipality PPT of $210.52 shown in Figure 7. 
 36 
 
Figure 6.  Comparison of Paired Air Force and Municipality PPT: Less than 75 
Containers.  
 





In summary, we were unable to determine, that on average and at an appropriate 
level of confidence, that the total population of CONUS Air Force Bases pay a greater PPT 
than respective municipalities. Though we were unable to reject the null hypothesis using 
conservative conversion estimates, we were able to identify multiple Air Force Bases 
which pay a significantly greater PPT than their respective municipality. Additionally, we 
found that there were only two significant cost drivers with a regression relationship with 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
Our project tries to understand the large differences in prices paid for ISWM 
contracted services. To effectively analyze ISWM contract price variances for solid waste 
disposal services between Air Force installations, and between Air Force installations and 
their surrounding local municipalities, we utilized hypothesis testing about the difference 
between two population means and multivariate linear regression modeling. Using these 
statistical models, we were unable to determine, that on average and at an appropriate level 
of confidence, the total population of CONUS Air Force bases pay a greater Price Per Ton 
(PPT) than respective municipalities. However, we were able to identify multiple Air Force 
installations that had significant enough price differences that require further analysis and 
scrutiny. Also, by utilizing the regression model, we were able to identify two significant 
cost drivers: Air Force base number of containers and the Air Force bases’ distance to 
landfills. 
B. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of the research was to provide a means to identify efficiencies or 
inefficiencies in the procurement of ISWM services, which require substantial annual 
funding obligations. Also, our purpose was to improve future acquisitions of ISWM 
services the further safeguard scarce government resources. Our team wanted to deliver 
information to the Air Force which would aid them in ensuring ISWM services were 
provided by contractors at best value to the government. We wanted to provide the Air 
Force with a tangible metric, such as average PPT of disposed solid waste, which could be 
compared against Air Force installation PPT as well as their co-located municipalities. 
These collected and standardized local city prices were compared to Air Force prices and 
used to determine whether the Air Force on average overpays for ISWM services. A 
comparison between both the local municipalities and Air Force installations further assists 
Air Force contracting organizations in determining whether or not the prices paid are fair 
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and reasonable when compared to the Air Force average and when compared to the 
individual installations’ municipality. 
We can now answer the three original questions presented at the beginning of our 
research in order to provide Air Force with a clearer understanding of the ISWM market 
and cost drivers.  
1. Using AFICA pricing data, what is driving the price variation (unit 
price) across CONUS Air Force installations for solid waste disposal 
services?  
We determined there were two significant cost drivers, the independent variable of 
Air Force Base number of containers and Air Force Base distance to landfill. Though these 
cost drivers were significant, when combined, less than 10% of the variability in Air Force 
ISWM PPT can be explained by the linear relationship between these two independent 
variables. 
2. Using municipality pricing data, how do municipality unit prices 
compare to Air Force unit prices? 
We were unable to determine, that on average and at an appropriate level of 
confidence, that the total population of CONUS Air Force Bases pay a greater PPT than 
respective municipalities. Though we were unable to reject the null hypothesis using 
conservative conversion estimates, we were able to identify multiple Air Force Bases 
which pay a significantly greater PPT than their respective municipality 
3. Using local cost of living indices, do local consumer price indices 
account for the variation in prices paid for solid waste disposal 
services? 
We found that consumer price indices were insignificant variables in explaining 
variations in prices paid. The regression data analysis tool allows us to confidently 
conclude that there is no relationship between consumer price indices and prices paid for 
ISWM services.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS  
The first recommendation is to standardize the CLIN cost structure in ISWM 
contracts across all Air Force installations to be in accordance with industry standards. 
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While researching with AFICA to obtain the cost breakdown per installation, it became 
apparent that each installation formats their CLINs differently. This, in turn, would become 
problematic because of the difficulty in comparing each installation’s costs, line-by-line, 
to successfully compare installation prices to one another. As previously discussed, this 
forced us to normalize the sample dataset by calculating the overall PPT for each Air Force 
base. 
Every local municipality provided their cost breakdown in terms of bin size, 
number of bins, and frequency of pick-up, which is the industry standard. Due to the 
disparity in the reporting of costs of the installations, we had to normalize the local 
municipality data to compare them to Air Force bases, converting the local municipality 
costs to PPT. The format the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) uses for ISWM services is 
the best example of what we are proposing. We refer to this cost structure as the “Monterey 
Model.” Appendix B is a copy of NPS’s most recent contract with the city of Monterey. 
The costs are broken down by container size, number of containers, and number of pick-
ups per week. 
The additional steps required to normalize the data to make direct comparisons, 
begs the question of how the Air Force can properly conduct market research when their 
cost structure is not directly comparable with the industry standards. Having the ability to 
compare with other organizations, like local governments, will aid in determining if 
proposed prices are fair and reasonable. Also, contracting officers are unable to compare 
their proposed costs with other installations which aid in determining fair and reasonable 
prices. 
The second recommendation is that Air Force ISWM contracting officers be 
required to compare local municipality costs and all Air Force installation costs during 
market research. As previously discussed, multiple bases have substantially higher PPT 
costs than their local municipalities and other Air Force bases. Conducting market research 
with local governments and other installations will help contracting officers avoid 
accepting substantially higher prices, as well as decrease the large variability of prices 
between installations. This research will also provide a means of rebuttal to offerors during 
negotiations because they now have more information available to negotiate lower prices. 
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Finally, this process will decrease installation contracting officers’ reliance on historical 
prices paid.  
The third recommendation is that each installation’s contracting officer report 
detailed CLIN level data and a calculated PPT into a repository that is accessible to all in 
order to better accommodate contracting officers during the market research process. We 
understand that there is already a collection process, however, the current inputs are not 
detailed enough to enable adequate market research. The repository will be an avenue that 
helps not only contracting officers but also their chain of command in identifying potential 
cost drivers. This also gives the chain of command the ability to hold each installation 
accountable and able to quickly identify outliers. 
The fourth recommendation is for AFICA to deep dive into the contracts of 
previously identified outliers to find the cost drivers creating such large variations. This is 
a necessary step because we could not identify variables with strong regression 
relationships to explain the large variation in prices. The deep dive will aid AFICA in 
developing comprehensive lessons learned and best practices that can be incorporated into 
future contracts to save scarce governmental funds. 
Finally, our fifth recommendation is to utilize category management and strategic 
sourcing with ISWM contracts. “Category management is an effective business practice 
for reducing duplication in contracting, better leveraging the government’s buying power, 
and promoting the use of best in class solutions government-wide” (Category Management 
[CM], 2016, p. 69860). Also, category management “provides a pathway for agencies to 
move away from managing purchases and prices individually across thousands of 
procurement units and towards managing entire categories of common spend with 
collaborative decision-making” (CM, 2016). ISWM contracts are a prime candidate to 
benefit from category management and strategic sourcing considering the large variances 
across each installation. Consolidating ISWM services into a regional contract will allow 
the Air Force to assign experts in the ISWM market to manage ISWM service contracts. 
Also, this solution will help reduce unit costs through increasing the size of the contract, 
reduce duplicating administrative costs, and better manage requirements per installation 
(CM, 2016). Much of the success of category management will come from consolidating 
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services and standardizing the requirements at each installation based on their size and 
actual usage. Consolidation of each installation’s services will help eliminate unnecessary 
requirements and give the Air Force the ability to select the right size of service required. 
Strategic sourcing will further reduce unit costs, volume of services per installation, 
and improve operating efficiencies through a critical analysis of an organization’s spending 
(Dieges, 2013). Also, strategic sourcing provides a means of continuous monitoring of 
ISWM contracts and helps contracting teams to “adjust their strategy to include for 
efficiencies and greater savings” (Dieges, 2013). As explained by Hartmann, Landale, and 
Rendon, “category management and strategic sourcing require extensive market 
research—a much more comprehensive examination and understanding of the markets for 
common products and services than the federal government has ever performed in the past” 
(R. Rendon, email to author, July 13, 2017, p.2). By implementing these two concepts, the 
other recommendations provided by us will be satisfied, thus creating a more efficient and 
cost-effective contracting process for ISWM services. 
D. AREAS REQUIRING FURTHER RESEARCH 
In order to explain why CONUS Air Force bases pay a greater PPT than respective 
municipalities, the Air Force installations with over twice the PPT costs of their local 
municipality need to be further scrutinized at the contract line item number (CLIN) level. 
The main cost drivers at each Air Force installation need to be identified in order to evaluate 
negative trends may be driving up costs. We limited our research to analyze the overall 
PPT. We did not analyze costs at the CLIN level, nor did we poll the government 
contracting officers of each ISWM contract to better understand each installation’s ISWM 
contracting process. A detailed level of scrutiny with the ISWM contracts of the seven Air 
Force installations identified in the findings chapter as having the highest levels of 
variance, is a vital step to further understand the price differences. 
Two areas we believe might explain the higher prices paid by the Air Force are the 
cost of regulation and additional security requirements placed on ISWM service. The 
additional federal laws and regulations placed on government ISWM programs and 
government contracts in general might explain the price differences between the local 
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municipalities and Air Force bases. These two theories require more research to validate 
this theory and help identify what the true cost of federal regulations are. Unfortunately, 
this will not fully explain why the seven Air Force bases identified have the highest level 
of variance, because the cost of regulation and security should be similar across all CONUS 
Air Force bases. However, this assumption would establish a baseline of expected costs. 
Once these baseline regulation and security costs are identified, researchers would be better 
equipped to pinpoint the additional costs that are outside the expected range.  
Based on our research and limited data, we could not theorize why there are five 
Air Force installations with less than half the PPT costs of their local municipality. 
However, the Air Force should review each of those five contracts with a detailed level of 
examination and talk to the respective government contracting officers. Some questions 
the Air Force should focus on answering are as follows: 
1. How did the contracting officer conduct market research?  
2. Are there special contract provisions that are providing cost savings? 
3. Is there anything unique that the contracting officer did during the 
planning or development phase? 
4. Which CLINs are significantly lower than other Air Force installations?  
5. Are their contracts in accordance with industry standards? 
These questions will aid the Air Force in developing lessons learned and implement best 
practices across all installations. 
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APPENDIX A.  EMAIL TO MUNICIPALITIES 
Dear XXXX,  
My name is Lieutenant Commander XXXX, I am a student at the Naval 
Postgraduate School conducting research on solid waste contract costs. Our research team 
is comparing and contrasting the costs of solid waste disposal between Air Force bases and 
their neighboring cities. We hope this will help military leadership in deciding the types of 
service contracts they should pursue across bases. 
To that end, my team and I are inquiring as to how municipalities manage their 
solid waste contracts in an effort to use them as a model to improve Air Force contract 
processes. 
I am hoping that you can answer a few quick questions in support of our research 
for the military and the federal government. 
 What type of contract does your city use for solid waste disposal?  
 What are the negotiated rates for solid waste collection at city owned buildings 
(e.g., per bin size and frequency of collection)?  
 What are your published prices for commercial business rates for solid waste 
collection (e.g., per bin size and frequency of collection)?  
 Is the local Air Force installation’s solid waste contract managed by your city? 
What are the Air Force base’s rates? Are the Air Force base’s rates the same as the 
negotiated rates for the city? What is the surcharge rate applied to the Air Force for 
the city to manage its solid waste contract?   
 Are there standing city regulations requiring the local Air Force installation utilize 
the same hauler that is already contracted with the city?  
The information you provide will be treated as confidential. Our report will be 
sanitized of any city, Air Force installation, or commercial hauler names. After the report 
is complete, we would be happy to share our findings with you. 
Thank you very much for your time and support, your vital contribution to our 
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APPENDIX B.  EXAMPLE OF “MONTEREY MODEL” LINE ITEM 
NUMBERS 
According to Ted Terrasas (email to author, October 12, 2017), the below table is 
an example of the “Monterey Model.” 
 
ATTACHMENT J-0200000-04 
EXHIBIT LINE ITEM NUMBERS 
SOLICITATION/CONTRACT # N62473-14-C-2811 
EXHIBIT A - CLIN 9000–AWARD PRICING 
  
Base Period 1 May 2014 through 30 April 2015 
ELINs A001 though A005 









QTY Pickups  
Per 
Week  
Buyer  Monthly 
Cost   
 Cost  
Per Year   
A001 - Main Campus, NSAM 
A001AA 208 Gymnasium 4 1 2 M/F NSAM  $549.43 $6,593.20 





yr NSAM Variable*   $17,999.10 
A001AC 232 Spanagel Hall 6 2 2  T/TH NSAM $1,612.25  $19,347.05 
A001AD 236 Boiler Plant 4 1 3 M/W/F NSAM $811.26  $9,735.14 
A001AE 246 Watkins Hall 4 1 3 M/W/F NSAM $811.26  $9.735.14 
A001AF 259 CCMR 4 1 1 F NSAM $289.92  $3,478.99 





yr NSAM Variable*  $8,399.58 
A001AH 330 Ingersol Hall 6 1 3 M/W/F NSAM $1,229.87 $14,758.38 
A001AI 339 Knox Library 6 1 3 M/W/F NSAM $1,229.87 $14,758.38 
A001AJ 426 
Public Works 
(General) 30 db 1 
On-Call 
 NTE 52/
yr NSAM Variable*  $24,449.33 
A001AK 426 
Public Works 
(Green Waste) 20 db 1 
On-Call  
NTE 60/
yr NSAM Variable*  $10,720.08 
A001AL 426 
Public Works 
(Floater) 20 db 1 
On-Call 
 NTE 12/
yr NSAM Variable*   $  4,288.16 
A001AM 438 
Environmental 
Storage  2 1 2 W/F NSAM $287.93  $  3,455.17 






SUBTOTAL ELIN A001 
  
           
$149,217.7
0             
A002–LRA 
A002AA 191 Snack Bar 3 1 2 M/F NSAM $418.60 $5,023.24 
A002AB 214 Astro Area  3   1 F NSAM $235.47 $2,825.68 
A002AC 217 Jet Lab 3 1 2 M/F NSAM $418.60 $5,023.24 
A002AD 425 Maint. Shop 3 1 1 F NSAM $235.47 $2,825.68 
A002AE 230 
RV Parking 
Lot 3 1 2 M/F NSAM $418.60 $5,023.24 
SUBTOTAL ELIN A002 $20,721.08  
A003–LMV 
A003AA 334 Navy Lodge 6 2 3 M/W/F NSAM 
 $  
2,444.82 $29,337.84 
A003AB 439 CDC 4 1 3 M/W/F NSAM 
 $     
811.26  $  9,735.14 
A003AC 444 Teen Center  3 1 1 F NSAM 
 $     
235.47  $  2,825.68 
SUBTOTAL ELIN A003 $41,898.66 
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